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Existing state-wide data bases on prosecutors’ decisions about ju-
venile offenders are important, yet often un-explored resources for un-
derstanding changes in patterns of judicial decisions over time. We in-
vestigate the extent and nature of change in judicial behavior toward
juveniles following the enactment of a new set of mandatory registra-
tion policies between 1992 and 1996 via analyzing the data on pros-
ecutors’ decisions of moving forward for youths repeatedly charged
with sexual violence in South Carolina. To analyze this longitudinal
binary data, we use a random effects logistic regression model via in-
corporating an unknown change-point year. For convenient physical
interpretation, our models allow the proportional odds interpretation
of effects of the explanatory variables and the change-point year with
and without conditioning on the youth-specific random effects. As a
consequence, the effects of the unknown change-point year and other
factors can be interpreted as changes in both within youth and popu-
lation averaged odds of moving forward. Using a Bayesian paradigm,
we consider various prior opinions about the unknown year of the
change in the pattern of prosecutors’ decision. Based on the available
data, we make posteriori conclusions about whether a change-point
has occurred between 1992 and 1996 (inclusive), evaluate the degree
of confidence about the year of change-point, estimate the magnitude
of the effects of the change-point and other factors, and investigate
other provocative questions about patterns of prosecutors’ decisions
over time.
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1. Introduction. In the United States, juvenile sex offenders are increas-
ingly being treated as adult offenders, and are being subjected to similar
punishments and restrictions [Letourneau and Miner (2005)]. In particular,
federal and state sex offender registration and public notification require-
ments have been extended now to include juveniles, with little consideration
of differences between adult and juvenile development or culpability [Garfin-
kle (2003)]. Ideally, these considerations should influence legal responses to
juvenile criminal behavior [Trivits and Reppucci (2002); Zimring (2004)]. A
series of landmark registration laws and policies dealing with juvenile sex
offenders was implemented across the US throughout the mid-to-late 1990s
[Chaiken (1998)]. Initially, these important policies required probationers
and paroled sexual offenders to register personal information with law en-
forcement (‘registration’ laws), but subsequent major amendments increased
public access to registry data (‘notification’ laws).
These policies, including community notification or public registration,
were enacted with great hope to improve community safety via either pre-
venting or detecting early recidivism of sexual offenses (e.g., community
members can notify the police about suspicious behavior by a known sex
offender), as well as deterring sex offenders from committing new sexual
offenses (e.g., offenders may be discouraged from committing new offenses
if they believe that both the police and community members are providing
additional surveillance of their activities) [LaFond (2005); Terry and Furlong
(2004)]. The extent of such intended beneficial effects of these registration
policies has been questioned [LaFond (2005)] and substantive concerns have
been raised regarding possible latent negative consequences of such policies
[e.g., Edwards and Hensley (2001); Tewksbury (2005); Zevitz (2006)], partic-
ularly with respect to the application of these policies to juvenile offenders
[Trivits and Reppucci (2002); Zimring (2004); Chaffin (2008)].
While most studies of latent consequences of such policies have focused
on barriers to the successful reintegration of offenders into society [Levenson
and Cotter (2005)], it also has been theorized by some that the perceived
severity of some registration policies might have the unintended effect of
reducing the likelihood of formal prosecution [LaFond (2005)]. One recent
survey of family and juvenile court judges reported that the majority of
judges believed ‘registration’ could be harmful to juvenile offenders [Bumby,
Talbot and Carter (2009)]. Arguably, such a perception of these policies may
affect the decisions of prosecutors and judges. We would like to evaluate the
strength of the available data evidence to support the hypothesis of judicial
decision makers (particularly prosecutors) becoming less likely to prosecute
a juvenile charged with sexual offense during the period of enactment of
these policies. To address this, we analyze the data on prosecutors’ decision
making pattern toward juvenile sexual offense charges during 1988–2005, a
period of time encompassing the enactment of sex offender registry and other
BAYESIAN ANALYSIS OF SEX-OFFENDERS 3
related laws/amendments in South Carolina (SC). To further understand
the extent of the change in decision patterns of the prosecutors, we would
also like to estimate the magnitude of this change (if it exists) in terms of
change in odds of prosecution after the change-point time and determine
other factors affecting the prosecutors’ decisions during this period.
1.1. Prosecution of juvenile sex offenders. We now explain the reasons
for focusing on responses from prosecutors for understanding the changes
in the judicial decision makers’ actions toward juvenile offenders. After a
certain charge has been brought against a youth by law enforcement, the
prosecutor is the first judicial decision maker encountered by the youth.
Other judicial decision makers such as judges play their respective role only
after a prosecutor’s decision to move forward on the case has been made.
South Carolina has a very well maintained juvenile justice database which
serves as an invaluable resource for examining the change in patterns of
prosecutor’s decision-making. We reiterate that we decided to use the pros-
ecutors’ decisions to move forward on initial felony sexual offense cases as
the response variable relevant to prosecutors decisions.
Like many other states, SC’s registration and notification policies enacted
in 1995 and 1999, respectively (SC Code of Laws §§ 23-3-400 et seq.) exceed,
in every respect, the original federal registration and notification require-
ments established in the 1990s (e.g., Federal 42 USCA § 14071, 14072; Pub.
L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345) and continue to exceed even the expanded
requirements more recently established by the Adam Walsh Child Safety
and Protection Act of 2006. To give some examples of the deviations from
federal guidelines, SC’s policies (a) require lifetime registration with no ex-
ceptions; (b) have no lower age limit for the registration of sexual offenders
(e.g., children as young as 10 years of age have been required to register)
and make few distinctions between juvenile and adult offenders; (c) make
no distinctions between low and high risk offenders; and (d) include noncon-
tact sexual offenses such as voyeurism and indecent exposure. Due to the
breadth and great severity of SC’s policies and their application to teens
and pre-teens, it is anticipated that SC’s policies have unintended effects of
reducing the probability of prosecutor’s decision of moving forward with the
initial sexual charge.
1.2. Focus on repeat sexual offense charges. We have chosen the binary
response of prosecutor decision to prosecute (called ‘moving forward’) as
the primary response variable related to judicial decision. We investigate
the nature and magnitude of changes in probability of moving forward with
juvenile sexual offense by studying the available data about an interesting
group of 358 male youths charged with sexual offenses in SC at least twice.
The effects of public registration policies on repeat offenders have not yet
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been examined (for both adult or juvenile offenders) but they are relevant for
several reasons. First, registration and notification policies were developed
in response to public outrage over especially heinous and well-publicized
sexual offenses by known sex offenders [LaFond (2005)]. These policies were
intended to target only the most severe offenders who were unlikely to be
juveniles because sexual recidivism is rare for youth offenders [Fortune and
Lambie (2006)]. However, a repeat offense charge might serve as a useful
indicator of offender severity. Second, as has been demonstrated in previous
research [Howell (2003)], number of prior offenses (any offense, not just sex-
ual) may influence the likelihood of cases moving forward. There was some
evidence to suggest that prosecutors may distinguish between first-time and
repeat offenders. Whether this finding applies to repeat juvenile sex offend-
ers is unknown. Third, if it is found that the risk of registration negatively
influences the likelihood of prosecution even for repeat offenders [as it appar-
ently does for first-time offenders; see Letourneau et al. (2009)], the public
policy implications of such a finding would be profound. Juvenile justice en-
counters for sex crimes contribute little to the prediction of adult sex crimes
[Caldwell (2002); Zimring, Piquero and Jennings (2007)]. Nevertheless, re-
peat juvenile sex offenders represent a small but important subgroup that
might benefit from additional surveillance and treatment that accompanies
adjudications. Most sexual offenders in the US receive treatment only after
legal prosecution and undetected sex offenders have little motivation to seek
out professional help. Thus, youths who are not prosecuted for serious sex-
ual offenses are unlikely to receive proper treatment or supervision. Recent
evidence of sex offender treatment effectiveness [Letourneau et al. (2009)]
makes evidence-based treatment of these youth all the more compelling.
There can be substantial amount of heterogeneity among youth offenders
due to how differently they interact with judiciary. This unobservable in-
teraction for each youth will be modeled by a youth-specific random effect.
Analyzing data with repeated (≥2 per youth) binary responses of prosecu-
tors’ decisions of moving forward at different time points will allow us to
assess the effects of the unobservable prosecutor-youth interaction on pros-
ecutor’s decision. Available data will facilitate the assessment of whether
prosecutors treat youths differently during a first offense charge compared
to a subsequent charge. Thus, following the change-point year, prosecutors
might become more lenient on first time offenders, while at the same time
they might adopt a more hardened approach to recidivists.
1.3. Unknown change-point. As noted before, our available data spans
from 1988 through 2005. It is conceivable that changes in patterns of prose-
cution could occur in any one (or more) of these years. Given implementa-
tion of South Carolina’s registration policy in 1995, we are most interested in
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Fig. 1. Panel plots of observed proportion p of prosecutor’s moving forward versus prose-
cution years. Panel (a): full data, panel (b): repeated offense, panel (c): first-time offense,
panel (d): severe offense and panel (e): nonsevere offense.
determining whether there is substantial data evidence for 1995 as a change-
point year. As seen in the plot of the raw data [Figure 1(a)], there was a
high magnitude of decrease in the observed proportion of prosecutors mov-
ing forward from 1994 to 1995 and this decrease appears substantial relative
to other fluctuations occurring within the full time interval. However, it is
difficult and naive to make any conclusion about possible change-point year
and magnitude of change in probability of moving forward from these raw
proportions (computed via ignoring effect of any covariate). Furthermore,
state data on juvenile arrest rates (for rape) also confirm a substantial drop
around 1994–1995 [McManus (2005), page 161], suggesting the influence of
the 1995 legislation on other judicial actors. Last, our own previous research
supports a change in prosecution patterns in 1995 for a data set with pre-
dominantly single offense charges [Letourneau et al. (2009)].
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There has been almost no research on repeat offenses by juvenile sex of-
fenders and, thus, it is an open argument as to whether the possible change-
point year for this smaller subset of offenders should be restricted to a sin-
gle year, 1995 in particular. The mandatory registration policy enacted in
South Carolina in 1995 might not be the main landmark policy for this
group. For example, 1996 was the year when several sex crimes were clas-
sified as ‘no parole’ crimes as part of South Carolina’s ‘truth in sentencing’
policies. Likewise, changes in juvenile transfer policies that made it easier
to transfer younger defendants (14–15 years old) to adult court for certain
offenses also occurred in 1996. Thus, these or other policy or policy changes
(e.g., lengthened sentences) could exert influence on the pattern of juvenile
judicial decision making. In spite of using our apriori belief that the most
likely year for change is 1995, our discrete prior distribution of the unknown
change-point year in between 1992 and 1996 will reflect a skeptical view that
laws enacted in years other than 1995 might also have caused the change in
pattern of prosecutors’ decisions. It could also be argued that legal policies
take time to reach their full effect on decision makers (e.g., reflecting a learn-
ing curve among judicial decision makers regarding the severity of a policy)
and that focusing on a single year of sudden change-point is unnecessarily
narrow. To address this concern, we incorporate a linear and a quadratic
coefficient of change-point effect to provide the flexibility of the nature of
effects generated by the change-point (if it exits).
If we find credible data evidence for any change in prosecutor’s pattern
of moving forward during 1992–1996, we would further like to find out the
most likely year of change-point as well as the magnitude of the change in
terms of odds ratio before and after the change-point year. The actual mag-
nitude of the change-point effect is important to understand the practical
consequences to society for such a change. We will handle these complex
goals using a model for longitudinal binary data where the change in the
odds of going forward after the change-point year can be estimated. Our
model is very different from the unknown change-point model used for sin-
gle time-series of quantitative responses discussed in Carlin and Louis (2000)
and other related works.
1.4. Youth heterogeneity and conditional/marginal odds ratio. Large sam-
ple based analysis using generalized estimating equations (GEE) for multi-
variate clustered binary outcomes [Zeger and Liang (1986)] is very common
in biomedical and behavioral studies. However, the unobservable prosecu-
tors’ reaction to different individual youths (youth specific youth-prosecutors
interaction effect) can substantially attenuate the actual subject-specific ef-
fects of covariates and time/year and change-point on the pattern of judicial
decision making. The marginal GEE approach is unable to estimate this
degree of attenuation. This attenuation is a measure of variability among
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youths regarding some youths being more predisposed (compared to others)
to receive a moving forward decision.
In our analysis, we express this latent/unobservable youth-specific in-
teraction as a random youth effect. We are interested in determining the
amount of attenuation in the effects of the change-point year and would
like to make probability statements about the actual change in probability
of moving forward in a particular year (say, 1995) based on observed data.
Consequently, we want to maintain key advantages of a marginal model
based GEE approach such as simple physical interpretation of covariates
and change-point year effects in terms of the marginal odds ratio. To achieve
this goal, we present an extension of the random intercept model proposed
by Wang and Louis (2003) in which the subject-specific model (conditional
on the youth-specific random intercept) as well as the marginal model (in-
tegrated over the distribution of the unobservable random intercept) have
the same link functions. The regression parameters in our conditional and
marginal models are not identical, but are proportional to each other and
the proportionality parameter will represent the attenuation of all the co-
variate and change-point effects on marginal response due to heterogeneity
of youths. For example, consider a youth with two offenses committed be-
fore and after the change-point year. Our model will be able to assess the
individualized odds of moving forward for the offense before change-point
year and the odds of moving forward for the same youth’s offense commit-
ted after the change-point year. The model will also be able to assess the
marginal odds ratio of moving forward for two offenses committed by two
different youths. This marginal odds ratio is smaller than the corresponding
conditional/individualized odds ratio.
2. Brief overview of the data. Every South Carolina youth (male) charged
by the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) with repeated felony-level sex-
ual offenses between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 2005 is included
for the present analysis. Female offenders were excluded due to the small
number of females in the database. Charges filed against minors in general
sessions (adult court) were not included in the study. The analysis focused
on felony sexual offenses because South Carolina’s registration and notifica-
tion policies primarily apply to sexual offenses. All data were drawn from
the South Carolina DJJ Management Information System in collaboration
with the South Carolina Budget and Control Board Office of Research and
Statistics. The data included a subset of variables regularly captured by
DJJ personnel during processing of each charge and subsequently during
progression of the case, viz. (a) demographic information, (b) youth’s crimi-
nal history, and (c) information regarding specific sexual felony charge (viz.
type of charge, degree of severity, charge date, prosecutor’s decision, etc.).
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Table 1
2× 2 table showing frequencies of repeat/first-time offenses vs. severe/nonsevere offenses
Severe offense Nonsevere offense Total
Repeated offense 284 (38%) 111 (15%) 395
First-time offense 322 (43%) 36 (4%) 358
Total 606 147 753
The database included records for 358 male offenders with a total of 753
offenses. For each charge, the prosecutor decision could indicate moving for-
ward (i.e., decision to formally adjudicate the youth), diversion (i.e., decision
to refer youth to a nonjudicial intervention that, if successfully completed,
would clear the initial charge), or dismissal (i.e., decision to not process or
otherwise dismiss the case). The longitudinal response variable Yit for youth
i at calendar time t is the binary indicator with Yit = 1 for moving forward
(70.7% of cases) and Yit = 0 for diversion or dismissal of the charge by the
prosecutors (29.3% of cases).
For each youth, a set of known/observable explanatory variables (fixed or
time-dependent) were recorded that may influence the probability of pros-
ecutor’s going forward. The set of fixed explanatory variables include age
at the time t of the offense, an indicator of repeated offense, severity index
of the offense, prosecution year, etc. The median age for this group of male
youths was 14.6 years with a range of 9–19 years. The charge severity rating
for each felony sexual charge determined by DJJ is based on the number of
years an adult would be incarcerated for a similar crime. The charge severity
ratings range from 1 (lowest level misdemeanor) to 25 (highest level felony
and typically reserved for 1st degree murder charges), with felony offenses
operationally defined as charges with severity ratings of 5 or higher [Bar-
rett, Katsiyanis and Zhang (2006)]. In practice, felony level sex crimes had
severity ratings of 5, 8, 15 and 21. For simplicity, we use a binary indicator
to classify the severity rating as severe (80.5% cases with severity rating >
8) and nonsevere (19.5% cases with severity rating ≤ 8). Similarly, we use a
binary indicator to record whether a particular offense is a repeated offense.
Out of the total 753 felony level sex offenses, 395 (52.4%) were repeated
offenses and the rest 358 (47.6%) were the first-time offenses. Table 1 shows
the 2× 2 table for the actual counts and proportions for charges with two
severity levels versus first-time/repeat charges. There were 481 cases (63.8%)
of prosecution conducted after the registration policy was implemented in
January 1995. Of the 358 male offenders, 326 (91.1% cases) had 2 offenses.
Among the remaining 32 youth offenders, 28 (7.8% cases) had 3 offenses, 3
(0.83% cases) had 4 offenses and 1 (0.27% cases) had 5 offenses. Thus, each
offender represents a cluster with the maximum cluster size being 5. Figure 1
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shows panel plots of the raw proportion of prosecutors moving forward vs.
year of prosecution for all charges (panel a), charges for repeated offenses
(panel b), charges for first-time offenses (panel c), charges for severe offenses
(panel d) as well as charges for nonsevere offenses (panel e). The figure sug-
gests some possible effect around 1995; however, the actual year of change-
point and its association with the type of charge (severe/first-time/repeat)
are not clear from the plots. The evidence of a latent change-point between
1992 and 1996 and its magnitude of influence on prosecutors’ decision and
other conjectures about the pattern of decisions over time can only be eval-
uated with a semi-continuous (change-point) model along with linear and
quadratic effects of change-point (that determines whether this change ef-
fect was gradual over years). Any interaction of each known explanatory
covariate with the change-point indicator (viz. repeat offense indicator with
change-point indicator) will be considered as a time-dependent covariate.
In the year 1999, the sexual offender registry became available online and
about half of registered juveniles were included. In addition to the unknown
change-point effect, we will also attempt to verify whether the notification
law of 1999 influenced the prosecutor’s decision since the year 2000. There
are 252 cases (33.5%) of prosecution after the implementation of the online
registry in 1999. Out of our concern for statistical association between differ-
ent pairs of explanatory variables (after properly accounting for clustering),
we used the non-Bayesian Rao–Scott chi-square test (available in SAS Pro-
cedure SURVEYFREQ) to find strong evidence of association between the
repeat offense indicator and the severity indicator (p-value < 0.001). We did
not expect any association among all other variables and similar frequentist
tests for evaluating association between the remaining explanatory variables
are not statistically significant. In our formal Bayesian analysis, we will eval-
uate whether both severity indicator and repeat offense indicator should be
included simultaneously as predictors.
The time-interval of the study (1988–2005) permitted examination of
cases processed during years prior to implementation of the South Car-
olina sex offender registration (i.e., January 1, 1988–December 31, 1994),
as well as cases processed during the four years following registration but
prior to implementation of the online registry website (i.e., January 1, 1995–
December 31, 1998) and cases processed during the years subsequent to
implementation of the Internet-based public registration (i.e., January 1,
1999–December 31, 2005). One of our aims in this article is to draw statis-
ticians’ attention to this important class of databases. These data can be
extensively and critically modeled and analyzed to investigate whether our
judicial decision making process is changing with time, with ever-shifting so-
cietal perception and evolving legislative activism. Assessing the existence
and effect of the change-point time induced by mandatory registration laws
on the prosecutor’s decision of moving forward with a juvenile sex offense
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case has tremendous societal implications in its own right and hence de-
mands serious exploration of available evidence via these databases.
3. Bridge random effects model. Our modeling goal is to interpret the
effects of change-point and other factors on the changes in ‘odds of moving
forward’ for a particular charge. The following model using a particular
random effects density (called the ‘Bridge’ density) preserves the odds ratio
interpretation of the change-point and other factors.
For i= 1, . . . , n exchangeable youths/subjects, sexual charges were brought
against youth i at years t= ti1, . . . , timi for mi ≥ 2. The binary response of
interest is Yit = 1 if the prosecutor decides to move forward (proceed with
the prosecution) for the sexual offense charge against the youth i at time t,
and Yit = 0 otherwise. For the random effects logistic regression model, the
conditional probability pit(Bi) = pr[Yit = 1|Bi, xit], given the subject-specific
unobservable Bi and the known p× 1 covariate vector xit measured at time
t, is
pit =
exp(Bi +βx
′
it)
1 + exp(Bi +βx
′
it)
,(3.1)
where β = (β1, . . . , βp) denotes the vector of regression parameters. The
offender-specific unobservable random effects Bi has density fB(b|φ) with
the variability parameter φ. The binary model with logit link in (3.1) gives
an easily understandable proportional odds interpretation of the covariate ef-
fects when we know the unobservable youth-specific Bi. However, the change
in odds ratio interpretation of the regression effects is not preserved in gen-
eral after integrating out Bi. When Bi follows a bridge distribution of Wang
and Louis (2003) with density,
fB(b|φ) = 1
2pi
sin(φpi)
cosh(φb) + cos(φpi)
, −∞< b <∞,(3.2)
indexed by unknown parameter 0<φ< 1, the marginal probability of mov-
ing forward (after integrating unobservable youth-specific Bi), still preserves
the logistic form unlike normal and t-density random effects and is given as
Pr(Yit = 1|xit) =EB [pit(Bi)] =
exp[(φβ)x′it]
1 + exp[(φβ)x′it]
,(3.3)
where EB denotes the expectation with respect to the density of Bi. The
bridge density is symmetric around mean zero [Wang and Louis (2003)] with
the variance given by σ2B = pi
2(φ−2 − 1)/3. Figure 2 displays the compari-
son of the bridge density (with variance = 2) with a Normal(0, σ2 = 2) and
a t-density having degrees of freedom ν = 4 (corresponding to a variance
of 2). The bridge density has a slightly heavier tail and is more peaked
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than the normal and the t-densities. We again emphasize that, unlike the
normal and the t-density, both the conditional probability in (3.1) and the
marginal probability in (3.3) of moving forward under the bridge density
random-effects have logistic links, with proportional odds interpretations of
the regression effects. To assess the need of incorporating a change-point
structure into our logistic regression framework, we divided the whole data
into two sections, (i) prosecution year < 1995 and (ii) prosecution year ≥
1995, and fit separate logistic regression models (using PROC LOGISTIC)
in SAS, considering all data points to be independent in each of the models.
We used prosecution age, severity indicator, repeat offense indicator and
prosecution year as covariates without any change-point term. Then, the
observed proportion of prosecutors ‘moving forward’ versus the estimated
(mean) proportion of prosecutors ‘moving forward’ (after LOWESS smooth-
ing) were plotted in Figure 3, overlayed on each other. The simple logistic
model for the ‘post-95’ data is clearly inadequate, as expected, due to the
Fig. 2. Probability density functions of Bridge, Normal and t-densities with zero mean
and variance =2. The x-axis denotes the range of x-values from −5 to 5.
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effect of the change-point somewhere around 1995. Clearly, there is a need
to account for the (possibly unknown) change-point structure in our model.
The Bayesian paradigm allows us to use effectively our apriori belief about
the occurrence of the change-point.
In this article we will use a novel extension of the longitudinal binary
model of (3.1) by allowing time-dependent covariates xit(T ) which are func-
tions of unknown year of change-point T as well as calendar time t. To
incorporate the effects of an unknown change-point year (1992≤ T ≤ 1996),
the covariate vector has two components, viz. (a) a vector x1it of either fixed
or time-dependent known/recorded covariates such as age at charge, binary
indicator of repeat offense for the charge, a dichotomized indicator for sever-
ity of offense, an indicator for the year of notification ‘2000,’ the prosecution
year t, and (b) a vector x2i(t, T ) of known functions of prosecution year t
and unknown change-point year T common to all subjects. The functions
of unknown T include the change-point indicator 1[t≥T ], a linear coefficient
Fig. 3. LOWESS smoothed plots of observed proportion of moving forward vs. estimated
(mean) proportion of moving forward for pre-95 and post-95 years.
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of the change-point indicator (t− T )1[t≥T ] and also a quadratic coefficient
(t−T )21[t≥T ]. The change-point term 1[t≥T ] accommodates a sudden change
in the pattern at time T . The linear and quadratic terms allow the change
in pattern to be continuous after the unknown change-point year T . We will
later discuss how to use discrete prior distribution of T to reflect our prior
opinion about what value/year T can take in the interval 1992–1996. We
also include the interaction of ‘repeat offense’ and ‘change-point indicator’
1[t≥T ;Repoff=1] to assess whether the magnitude of the change in prosecutors’
decision pattern after T depends on whether the charge is a first time offense
versus a repeat offense.
Our extension of the model in (3.1) is given as
logit{pit(Bi, T )}=Bi + β1x′1it +β2x′2i(t, T ),(3.4)
where the vectors β1 and β2 represent respectively the regression parame-
ters associated with the observable fixed/time-dependent covariates and the
effect of the unknown change-point T at year t. Using our model, we can
interpret the effect of each covariate, because we can obtain the marginal as
well as the conditional odds ratio. For example, if we define the parameter
for the indicator of repeat offense to be βRepoff , then the conditional odds
ratio e(βRepoff ) represents the ratio of the odd of moving forward when an
individual is charged with a repeat offense and the odd of moving forward
when the same charge is for a first offense. The attenuated marginal odds
ratio e(φβRepoff ) measures the ratio of the odd of moving forward for a youth
charged with repeat offense and the odd for another similar youth charged
with a first offense. The variability parameter 0< φ< 1 of the bridge den-
sity measures both the degree of attenuation of the marginal/population
effect versus conditional/individualized effect and the heterogeneity of the
decision making process. The extreme case of φ= 1 represents the situation
when there is no effect of the unobservable youth-prosecutor interaction and
the responses corresponding to all the charges from all the youths can be
considered as exchangeable. The extreme case of φ= 0 represents the situa-
tion when the unobservable youth-prosecutor effect is so high that it alone
determines the decision of moving forward. Unless we get strong data evi-
dence against the bridge density for fB(·|φ), we will prefer using the model
defined by (3.1) and (3.2) because this model ensures the convenient pro-
portional odds interpretation of the effects of covariates and change-points
both conditionally and marginally, and offers a simple role of the hetero-
geneity parameter φ as the attenuation factor of the marginal odds ratio of
two subjects in the presence of heterogeneity.
Using the regression model of (3.4), we can write the likelihood of β, the
unknown T and the random effects B= (B1, . . . ,Bn) based on the observed
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data y as
L(β,B, T |y)∝
n∏
i=1
mi∏
j=1
{pitij (Bi, T )}yitij {1− pitij (Bi, T )}yitij .(3.5)
To draw conclusions about the effects of covariates and the unknown change-
point year on the odds of moving forward, we used a Bayesian analysis of the
random effects logistic regression model accommodating unknown change-
point time T . The posterior conclusion for a Bayesian analysis is based on
the joint posterior of all the parameters given by
p(β,B, T,φ|y)∝ L(β,B, T |y)
(3.6)
×
[
n∏
i=1
fB(Bi|φ)
]
× pi1(T )× pi2(β)× pi3(φ),
where pi1(T ), pi2(β) and pi3(φ) are independent priors of T , β and φ of the
bridge density fB(Bi|φ) of (3.2). The key advantage of relying on Bayesian
inference to address the pertinent question of the influence of the sex-offender
registration laws on prosecutor’s decision making is the ability to incorporate
background (prior) information about the unknown parameters including
the unknown change-point year T . Thus, a proper selection of prior infor-
mation is an important step toward making an informed conclusion about
the data evidence from the study. Unlike the frequentist inference depend-
ing on large-sample inference, the Bayesian method relies heavily on the
simulations from the posterior of (3.6) via the Gibbs sampler [Gelfand and
Smith (1990)] and associated Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) tools.
The MCMC method provides the entire posterior distribution of any arbi-
trary functional of the parameters. In the following section we discuss the
determination of practical prior distributions for φ, discrete time T and
regression parameter β.
4. Choice of priors. In this section we develop practical informative
prior distributions for the parameters including the attenuation parame-
ter φ and the unknown change-point year T . While selecting a prior density
class/model, we prefer a class of densities with a small set of informative
features to be selected by investigators/statisticians. For each component βk
for k = 1, . . . , p of the regression parameter β, we use the zero centered dou-
ble exponential (DE) prior (often called Laplace prior) β ∼ DE(0, τ), with
p.d.f. τ2 exp(−τ |β|) for −∞< β <∞, and variance 2/τ2. The DE prior is a
widely used sparsity inducing prior with a heavy tail and peakedness at 0,
and hence expressing the prior belief that the distribution of βk, k = 1, . . . , p
is strongly peaked around 0 [Kaban (2007)]. This prior reflects our ‘skepti-
cal’ views about the covariate and change-point effects. Our strategy is to
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hold such a skeptical prior view unless there is a strong data-evidence sug-
gesting otherwise. We choose the precision parameter τ =
√
2 for each βk.
This choice of τ makes the prior variance of βk to be one. Assuming βk = 1
and a logistic model with a single covariate, this corresponds to a prior belief
that a change in 1 unit of a covariate can change the value of probability
pit of going forward from 0.5 to 0.73. For this data example, we believe our
prior belief allows for a large enough effect of each covariate (keeping other
covariates fixed) because 23% change in pit for a unit change of a covariate
is a very large change to expect in practice.
Our first prior for φ also represents a ‘skeptical’ (however, informative)
opinion that heterogeneity among young offenders does not cause large at-
tenuation of regression effect in marginal probability of moving forward.
To assure this, a Beta(2,1) prior density (with mean 0.67) is chosen for
φ to make the prior skewed toward 1. As an alternative, a Beta(1,1) [the
Uniform(0,1) prior] is considered as a competing ‘noninformative’ bench-
mark prior for φ.
We believe that the change-point year is within the interval 1992–1996 (if
the change-point had taken place at all), with the most plausible year being
1995. We use a Dirichlet prior on the years 1992–1996, that is, (γ92, . . . , γ96)∼
Dir(α92, . . . , α96), with joint density pi(γ92, . . . , γ96)∝
∏96
j=92 γ
αj
j , where γj =
P[T = j] and prior expectation of γj equals αj/α+ with α+ =
∑96
j=92αj . We
provide more prior weight to 1995 (landmark registration year) being the
unknown T compared to the other years. A prior belief very enthusiastically
favoring 1995 as T is given by (a) (α92, . . . , α96) = (1,1,1,6,1). This prior
implies the expected prior probability that the change-point happened in
1995 is 0.6, and the rest of the years in 1992–1996 has equal prior probabil-
ity. To represent a more skeptical belief, we consider two more choices of the
Dirichlet parameters, viz. (b) (1.6, 1.6, 1.6, 5, 1.6) representing an expected
prior probability of 0.45 for T = 1995 and 0.14 for each of the other years
and (c) (1.5, 1.5, 1.5, 3, 1.5) representing an expected prior probability of
0.33 for T = 1995 and 0.167 for the other years. It is important to note
that the prior in (b) has higher α+ than (a) and (c). This implies that the
certainty about the value of each γj is higher in (b) compared to the other
priors.
For a better description of the practical implication of our prior densities,
we also determine the extent of the effect of each component of xit on the
‘change in odds of moving forward’ as expected by our prior choice. We re-
call that the marginal prior density of each component βk is assumed to be
identical here. Based on two prior choices of φ, that is, φ ∼ Uniform(0,1)
and φ∼ Beta(2,1), the change in odds of moving forward can be anywhere
between 0.05 and 14.4 with 95% probability. This shows that our particular
joint priors allow for the possibility of a very large change in odds of moving
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forward in either direction. To address a practical concern about whether
each of our prior models allow wide flexibility about the probability of mov-
ing forward at any particular year, we verified whether the range of possible
values of the probability
p∗T,t =
exp(φβx∗′(t, T ))
1 + exp(φβx∗′(t, T ))
(4.1)
are wide enough for all possible values of t and T . We consider p∗T,t as the
probability of moving forward for a randomly selected youth (with median
age) charged with a severe repeat sexual offense in year t when the change-
point year T is known. For t= 1996 and T = 1995, the range between 0.004
and 0.997 indicates that our prior belief allows a wide range of possible
values of the probability of moving forward at any year.
5. Bayesian computation and model selection. In this section we discuss
the MCMC computation and model selection and assessment procedures for
eight competing models, determined by the sets of prior assumptions for
change-point T and the attenuation parameter φ. The reader less interested
about technical details about model selection and MCMC computation can
skip this section and proceed to the next section for detailed analysis and
findings from the study. The competing models under consideration are as
follows:
Model-1: (γ92, . . . , γ96)∼ Dir(1,1,1,6,1) and φ∼Uniform(0,1);
Model-2: (γ92, . . . , γ96)∼ Dir(1.6,1.6,1.6,5,1.6) and φ∼Uniform(0,1);
Model-3: (γ92, . . . , γ96)∼ Dir(1.5,1.5,1.5,3,1.5) and φ∼Uniform(0,1);
Model-4: (γ92, . . . , γ96)∼ Dir(1,1,1,6,1) and φ∼ Beta(2,1);
Model-5: (γ92, . . . , γ96)∼ Dir(1.6,1.6,1.6,5,1.6) and φ∼ Beta(2,1);
Model-6: (γ92, . . . , γ96)∼ Dir(1.5,1.5,1.5,3,1.5) and φ∼ Beta(2,1);
Model-7: model with no change-point;
Model-8: model with the change-point year fixed at 1995.
The prior for the regression parameters is the same for each of the above
prior models. For each prior model representing different prior opinion,
the computation of the posterior distribution was performed via iterative
MCMC [Gelfand and Smith (1990)] techniques. To sample from the joint
posterior under each prior model, we need to sample from the conditional
distributions of different model parameters. Each conditional posterior is
proportional to the joint posterior density (6) as a function of the cor-
responding parameter. The conditional posteriors of Bi,β and φ are log-
concave (proofs omitted), therefore, standard adaptive rejection algorithms
of Gilks andWild (1992) are applicable to sample from these conditional pos-
teriors. The relevant Gibbs sampling steps were implemented readily using
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freeware package WinBUGS [Spiegelhalter et al. (2005)]. We used 50,000 itera-
tions with an initial burn-in of 45,000. Convergence of the generated samples
was assessed using standard tools such as trace plots and ACF plots as well
as Gelman–Rubin diagnostics. The initial values for the fixed effects param-
eters were selected arbitrarily. We used two different MCMC chains (with
two different initial values) to be reasonably confident about convergence.
Derivation of the full conditional posterior distributions of model parameters
along with associated WinBUGS code to implement the estimation strategy
is provided in the supplemental article [Bandyopadhyay (2009)].
Our initial model selection was performed using the Deviance Information
Criterion (DIC) of Spiegelhalter et al. (2002). DIC reflects the goodness of
fit as well as the complexity of the hierarchical model within the Bayesian
paradigm and is considered to be a Bayesian version of the Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC). It is defined as DIC =D+ pD, where D =E(D(Θ)|y)
is the posterior mean of the deviance and pD is the effective number of pa-
rameters in the model. Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) showed that pD can be
approximated as pD =D −D(Θˆ), where Θˆ is a suitable ‘plug-in’ estimate
of Θ, viz. the posterior mean, or median. The DIC is essentially a single-
number summary (lower is better) of the relative fit between the model and
the ‘true model’ generating the data for the purpose of prediction. A dif-
ference larger than 10 is considered overwhelming evidence in favor of the
better model [Burnham and Anderson (2002)].
After selecting the best model using DIC criterion, we also employed
model validation diagnostics through conditional predictive ordinate (CPO)
statistics [Gelfand, Dey and Chang (1992)] and the associated ‘log pseudo-
marginal likelihood’ (LPML). The CPO is a cross-validated approach and
based on posterior predictive probability of observed data. For the ob-
served response yij from youth i at time tij with covariate vector Xij , the
CPO statistic for observation (i, j) is defined as CPOij = f(yij|D(−ij)) =∫
f(yij|Θ,Xij)pi(Θ|D(−ij))dΘ, where pi(Θ|D(−ij)) is the posterior density
of parameter vector Θ given D(−ij), the cross-validated data without the
(i, j)th observation. Using a harmonic mean approximation result from
Gelfand, Dey and Chang (1992), the CPOij can be easily computed with
MCMC samples from the full posterior pi(Θ|D). Typically, the CPOij ’s be-
have as Bayesian residuals and are plotted against any covariate values xij
(or observed Yij ’s) to determine patterns of covariate dependence as well
as identify possible outliers. Larger values of CPOij indicate better support
for the model from the observation yij . A summary measure based on the
CPO is the logarithm of the psuedo-marginal likelihood (LPML) defined as
LPML =
∑
i,j log(CPOij), where a higher value of the LPML means better
support of the model from the observed data.
We observe that Models 1–6 exhibit somewhat similar fit (based on D),
but the effective parameter count pD greatly varies. Based on the DIC values,
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we make a more detailed comparison between Models 1 and 5 whose DIC
values are the lowest, being 821.4 and 832.3 respectively. For these two
models, the DIC scores reflect a considerable trade-off between data fidelity
(D) and the effective number of parameters pD. The pD value is much lower
for Model 1 (=63.4) than Model 5 (=76.6). The DIC value for Model 8
(fixed change-point model) was somewhat closer (=838.8) to Model 5, but
for Model 7 (no change-point model), it was far away (=890.6). As described
earlier in Section 2, a non-Bayesian but convenient procedure such as the
Rao–Scott chi-square test shows a high evidence of association between the
binary indicator of repeat offense and the dichotomized severity indicator (p-
value < 0.001). If we omit the binary severe offense indicator from Model 1,
the corresponding interval estimate of the repeat offense indicator has a
slightly tighter 95% credible interval (−1.041, −0.105) than Model 1 at
expense of a high DIC price (859.7).
To assess model validation in terms of predictive performance, we use the
box-plots of log(CPO) statistics to compare between Models 1, 7 and 8 in
Figure 4. The median value of log(CPO) for Model 1 is indicated by the
horizontal line in each of the panels. Panel (a) reveals that on the overall,
both Models 1 and 8 (model with fixed change-point) exhibit significantly
better predictive performance over Model 7 (model with no change-point),
though Model 1 performs marginally better than Model 8. All 3 models have
similar fit for prosecution years before 1992 [panel (b)] as well as beyond
1996 [panel (d)]. For the prosecution years between 1992 and 1996 [panel
(c)], the log(CPO) values for Model 1 are marginally better than Model 8
and distinctly better than Model 7. Considering panels (c), (e) and (f),
it is clear that there is strong evidence for a model with a change-point
around 1995. This is clearly demonstrated in log(CPO) plots for Models 1
and 8 which includes a change-point term. The LPML values for Models 1,
7 and 8 are respectively −309.78,−350.72 and −320.43, confirming again
a marginally better predictive performance of the unknown change-point
model over the fixed change-point model. While Model 1 includes a moderate
‘prior opinion’ of 1995 as the change-point year, Model 8 uses the prior view
that the change-point is known to be exactly 1995. Model 1 does not prove
to be much superior than Model 8 as determined by DIC and predictive
performances, yet we choose Model 1 for further analysis primarily because
of the absence of a common mandate in the literature (before this analysis)
of restricting 1995 as the change-point year for this subset of juvenile sex
offenders with repeated sex offenses.
To determine an overall goodness of fit of Model 1, we also computed
the Bayesian p-value [Gelman et al. (2004)], which measures the discrep-
ancy between the data and the model by comparing a summary χ2 statis-
tic of the posterior predictive distribution to the true distribution of the
data. The summary statistics from the predicted and observed data are
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given by χ2(Y,Θg) and χ2(Yrep,g,Θg), respectively, where Yrep,g denote
the replicated value of Y from the posterior predictive distribution of Θ at
the gth iteration of the Gibbs sampler. The Bayesian p-value was then cal-
culated as P (χ2(Yrep,g,Θg) > χ2(Y,Θg)), that is, the proportion of times
χ2(Yrep,g,Θg) exceeds χ2(Y,Θg) out of g = 1, . . . ,G simulated draws from
the posterior predictive distribution. For Model 1, we obtain the
p-value to be 0.41 which indicates an overall reasonable fit, that is, the
observed pattern would likely be seen in replications of the data under the
true model.
6. Results. Our conclusions of the data analysis were primarily based
on Model 1, which is the best model supported by the data. This model
uses the apriori belief that the most likely year of change in judicial decision
Fig. 4. Panel box-plots of log(CPO) for Models 1, 7 and 8 considering different time
intervals of prosecution. Larger values of log(CPO) indicate more support for the model.
The horizontal line in each panel denotes the median log(CPO) value for Model 1.
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Table 2
Posterior summaries of marginal odds ratios for Model 1. T denotes unknown time of
change-point
Odds ratio Mean Standard deviation 95% credible intervals
Age 1.15 0.037 (1.094, 1.236)
Repeat offense before T 0.604 0.163 (0.308, 0.932)
Repeat offense after T 1.131 0.217 (1.014, 1.639)
Severe offense 1.506 0.280 (1.049, 2.132)
Year of prosecution 1.155 0.096 (1.006, 1.373)
After change-point effect 0.256 0.086 (0.132, 0.483)
pattern is 1995, however, with a noninformative prior belief about the effect
of the change-point as well as the attenuation parameter φ. Based on 95%
credible intervals, we found strong posterior evidence of the effects of several
covariates on the odds of moving forward which includes (a) age at charge,
(b) dichotomized severity of offense, (c) year of prosecution, (d) indicator
of repeat offense, (e) indicator of whether the time of offense is after the
change-point and (f) interaction between repeat offense and change-point. In
particular, prosecutors were less likely to move forward on repeated offense
than the first-time sex offenses and less likely to move forward after the
change-point. The strong posterior evidence of the positive interaction effect
between repeat offense and change-point confirms the need to present the
effects of repeat offense charges separately for the time intervals before and
after the change-point.
Table 2 presents the posterior estimates together with 95% credibility in-
tervals (CI) of ‘marginal odds ratio’ of the covariates found to be relevant for
the prosecutor’s decision. The marginal odds ratio for any particular factor
represents the odds ratio between two randomly selected comparable youths
with only a unit difference in the relevant covariate. We now summarize
the implications of our results. The prosecutors are about 15% more likely
to move forward on charges for every year increase in age, about 16% more
likely to move forward for every year increase in prosecution year. The mean
increase in probability of moving forward is around 51% for severe offenses
as compared to nonsevere offenses. The odds of prosecution of a charge after
the change-point year will have a 26% reduction as compared to a charge
that happened before the change-point. Overall, prosecutors were less likely
to move forward on repeat offense cases. However, compared to a repeat
offense charge before the change-point, there is about a 13% increase in the
odds of moving forward for a comparable repeat offense after the change-
point. Interestingly, the magnitude of this increase in odds may be as low
as 1.4%. The posterior probability that the change-point occurred in 1995
(maybe due to the registration policy) for Model 1 is about 61% (95% CI
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between 32% and 87%), suggesting strong posterior evidence for 1995 be-
ing the ‘likely’ change-point year compared to any other year between 1992
and 1996. Interestingly, even for the Models 3 and 6 which use the skeptical
prior (c) defined in Section 4, we find similar strong evidence that a change-
point has occurred in the interval 1992–1996 (results omitted for brevity).
In summary, we conclude that there is strong posterior evidence of the ex-
istence of a change-point in between 1992 and 1996, with the most likely
year of change-point being 1995. The posterior estimate of the attenuation
parameter φ is 0.82 (95% CI between 0.732 and 0.891) and corroborates our
apriori belief about existence of moderate degree of heterogeneity among
youths (or heterogeneity due to interactions of different youths with pros-
ecutors). Interestingly, the posterior intervals of φ are very close for all six
models, indicating that the data supports strongly our skeptical prior be-
lief about φ. For Model 5, the 95% posterior CI of severity indicator effect
barely covers zero, indicating lack of overwhelming evidence of the existence
of severity effect when we are skeptical about 1995 being the change-point
year. Figure 5 plots the observed and predicted proportions of prosecutor’s
moving forward along with the 90% CI for the prosecution years between
1988 and 2005. Our semi-continuous (change-point) model clearly captures
the observed trend including the substantial reductions in 1994–1995 along
with the effect around 1999–2000. All the observed proportions are found
to lie within the 90% CI of the predicted ones. Our data analysis results
confirm that even using the most skeptical prior belief, there is enough pos-
terior evidence to support the effect of most of the variables on prosecutors’
decision making pattern over time. The posterior evidence is, however, in-
conclusive for the effect of the 1999 internet-based notification policy as
well as for the linear and quadratic terms confirming that the change-point
is abrupt rather than gradual. There was also no evidence of any gradual
and prevailing effects of this change-point from the predicted proportions in
Figure 5.
Figure 6 depicts plots of posterior predictive probabilities along with
95% CI estimates of prosecutor’s moving forward for prosecution years us-
ing various combinations of median (14.6 years) age, severe/nonsevere and
first/repeat offenses. All of these plots (Figures 5 and 6) reflect the apparent
posterior evidence of a change-point around 1995. In 1995, a nonrepeat of-
fense had a larger magnitude of the decrease in the posterior probability from
the previous year compared to the corresponding decrease for a repeated of-
fense. The decrease in magnitude of the probability in 1995 is largest for
first-time nonsevere offenses. For the plots of severe and nonsevere repeat
offenses in Figure 6, there does appear to be a reduction in the probability
of prosecutors moving forward on repeat offenses starting in 1995 (the year
registration was implemented) and this effect decreases over time. The 95%
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Fig. 5. Plots of observed and fitted posterior proportion p of prosecutor’s moving forward
versus prosecution years along with 90% credible intervals for Model 1.
CI seem to be wider for the nonsevere offenses than the severe offenses, in-
dicating more posterior uncertainty about these probabilities over time for
nonsevere offenses compared to that of severe offenses.
7. Concluding remarks and policy implications. Using data from South
Carolina juvenile male repeat sex offenders, this study examined how during
1992–1996, the change in pattern of prosecutor’s decision substantively al-
tered the consequences faced by these youths. Specifically, from 1995 through
the present, juveniles adjudicated as minors for certain sexual offenses have
faced lifetime registration and many of these youths have been subjected
to broad community notification via inclusion in South Carolina’s Internet-
based sex offender registry site. Results from an earlier GEE-based analysis
[Letourneau et al. (2009)] using a much bigger sample (cohort) also sug-
gested that prosecutors altered their behavior specifically in response to the
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Fig. 6. Plots of estimated posterior proportion p of prosecutor’s moving forward on ju-
venile sex-offenders with median (=14.6 years) age along with 95% credible intervals for
Model 1.
1995 legislation, such that they became less likely to move forward on serious
sexual offense cases. However, this previous study included an overwhelm-
ing proportion of first-time (or single) sexual offenses and was based on the
strong apriori assumption that the change-point year was known to be 1995.
The present study sought to expand on these earlier findings by focusing on
the prosecution of youths charged with repeated sexual offenses. The novelty
of this extensive analysis lies in utilizing the Bayesian paradigm for making
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useful and interpretable conclusions from a complex project involving mul-
tiple research questions and different prior opinions. The analytic strategy
(using Bridge random effects in a longitudinal model with unknown change-
points) permitted addressing and evaluating the heterogeneity of the youths
and determining attenuation effects after adjusting for this heterogeneity
simultaneously.
In many respects, results from our analysis further the findings from our
previous research. First, there was strong support for a significant change-
point occurring within the 1992–1996 time frame, and particularly for a
1995 change-point. Second, as we have previously found, prosecutors were
more likely to move forward on older defendants, defendants with more
(vs. fewer) prior adjudications and defendants charged with more severe
sexual offenses. Two compelling results suggest that applying lifetime sex
offender registration requirements to juvenile offenders altered prosecutor
behavior. First, prosecutors were less likely to move forward on sex offense
cases after than before the change-point, with particularly strong evidence of
a 1995 change-point, the year registration was implemented. Second, there
also was evidence that prosecutors were generally less likely to move forward
on repeat sex offense cases than on initial sex offense cases. As depicted in
Figure 6, the reduction of probability of moving forward appears to have
been strongest around 1995 for both repeat and nonrepeat offenses. After
a significant drop in the odds of moving forward on repeat cases before the
change-point, prosecutors became somewhat more likely to do so over time.
Thus, the chilling effect of lifetime registration on the prosecution of serious
repeat sexual offenses might be declining.
Policy implications of these findings are necessarily limited by the need
to replicate results with data from other states/population. At minimum,
however, it appears safe to state that SC’s experiment with the lifetime reg-
istration of juvenile sexual offenders is having unintended effects of reducing
the probability of prosecution of these youths, which in turn may adversely
affect community safety via reduced supervision and treatment of juvenile
sex offenders. In light of concerns about latent consequences of public reg-
istration to juvenile offenders [Chaffin (2008); Trivits and Reppucci (2002)]
and the typically low sexual recidivism risk posed by juvenile sexual offend-
ers [Fortune and Lambie (2006)], results from our studies suggest that state
and federal registration policies could be revised without increasing the risk
of harm to community members. In particular, policies in which long term
public registration requirements are trigged solely on juvenile adjudication
offense (and not other indicators of recidivism risk) should be targeted for
modification. When prosecutors believe that only the most severe and high-
est risk offenders will face long term and/or public registration, they may
be less likely to alter their judicial behavior. Three specific modifications
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may achieve this aim. First, to reduce the threat of harmful latent conse-
quences to youth, offenders adjudicated as minors should not be subjected to
broad community notification requirements (e.g., should not be included on
Internet-based registry websites). Second, to ensure that registration targets
high risk offenders, registration requirements should be based on comprehen-
sive risk assessments, as is currently the case in several states. Third, the du-
ration of registration requirements should reflect developmental differences
between juvenile and adult offenders (and between younger and older juve-
niles). For example, as is the case with duration of probation, registration
requirements could end with the offender reaching the age of majority in his
or her state in the absence of subsequent sexual or violent offenses. These
changes might permit judicial decision makers to have greater confidence
that youth targeted by registration policies are, indeed, deserving of the
consequences that attend these policies and such confidence should reduce
the unintended effects of registration policies on judicial decision making.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplement: Posterior computations and code for Changing approaches
of prosecutors toward juvenile repeated sex-offenders: A Bayesian evalua-
tion (DOI: 10.1214/09-AOAS295SUPP; .pdf). The web supplement provides
derivation of the conditional posterior distributions as well as the associated
WinBUGS code for the analysis.
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